Separating and pooling equilibria in Akerlof model Player 1 first observes the quality (q) of the in

Separating and pooling equilibria in Akerlof model

Player 1 first observes the quality (q) of the indivisible
good he owns

before proposing a price (p) at which he will sell the good
to Player 2,

who responds to the offer by either accepting or rejecting Trade
takes

place at a price of p if Player 2 accepts; otherwise no
trade takes place

Player 1’s payoff equals the revenue (p or 0) he receives,
irrespective of

quality; Player 2’s payoff equals q − p if trade
takes place, and otherwise

equals 0 Quality can take two values, L and H, where H >
L > 0, and is

equally likely to take each value Describe all separating
and all pooling

equilibria of this game