Suppose there are N firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Inverse demand function is given by P=a-Q, where Q

Suppose there are N firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Inverse demand function is given by P=a-Q, where Q=q1+q2+q3+…+qN. Marginal cost of production is c for all firms. Consider the infinitely repeated game based on this stage game.a) what’s the collusion(maintain the monopoly output level, evenly sharfed by each firm) profit pi m and what is the cournot competition profit pi c for each firm?b) Suppose firms collude and enjoy their monopoly profits , and use grim trigger strategy such thatupon detection of any deviation, other firms will supply their Cournot outputs forever since. Writedown the inequality condition such that firms can use trigger strategies to sustain the monopolyoutput level in a subgame-perfect N.E.?c) Solve the lowest value of delta (discount factor)in (b) when N=9.